embodied mind, Kognitywistyka
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New Ideas in Psychology 18 (2000) 23}40
The bodily basis of thought
!,"
!
Department of Political Science & Psychology, AC-4D06, York College, City University of New York (CUNY),
Jamaica, NY 11451, USA
"
New School for Social Research (USA), USA
Jay A. Seitz
Abstract
Classical cognitivist and connectionist models posit a Cartesian disembodiment of mind
assuming that brain events can adequately explain thought and related notions such as intellect.
Instead, we argue for the bodily basis of thought and its continuity beyond the sensorimotor
stage. Indeed, there are no eternally "xed representations of the external world in the `motor
systema, rather, it is under the guidance of both internal and external factors with important
linkages to frontal, parietal, cerebellar, basal ganglionic, and cingulate gyrus areas that subserve
cognitive and motivational activities. Indeed, the motor system, including related structures, is
a self-organizing dynamical system contextualized among musculoskeletal, environmental (e.g.,
gravity), and social forces. We do not simply inhabit our bodies; we literally use them to
think with.
`The words of language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my
mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are
certain signs and more or less clear images which can be `voluntarilya reproduced and
combined. . . . The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some of muscular
typea (Einstein quoted in Hadamard, 1996, ¹
he mathematician
'
s mind
: ¹
he psychology of
invention in the mathematical
,
eld
. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (original work
published 1945).)
(
Keywords:
Cognition; Brain; Action; Movement; Body; Embodied mind
1. Introduction
It has not been until recently that social and neuroscientists have seriously con-
sidered the nature and mechanisms of thought and cognition outside of the traditional
domains of language and logic. Indeed, the latter two have often been thought of as two
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sides of the same proverbial coin with di!erentsystemsoflogicatvariousdevelopmen-
tal periods undergirding the foundation of languages and numbers (Piaget, 1952).
Suggest to one forti"ed by this belief that logic is not the sole province of these areas of
cognition and immediately one is met with the usual recognizable incredulity: `Ah, but
you are simply using the word inappropriately outside of its normal extensiona,goesthe
complaint. Yet, one is reminded of Alice's response in Lewis Carroll's childhood novel.
`When
I
use a worda, Humpty Dumpty said, `it means just what I choose it to mean
* neither more nor lessa. `The question isa, said Alice, `whether you
can
make words
mean so many di!erent things.a`The question is,a said Humpty Dumpty, `which is to
be the master * that'salla (Carroll, 1872/1998).
Early theorists of sensorimotor learning and development, to their credit, recog-
nized the central importance of movement in cognitive development (e.g., Piaget,
1952). Unfortunately, the main thrust of these theories absorbs sensorimotor learning
into higher systems of thought draining it of its cognitive uniqueness and centrality in
early as well as later learning. This is surprising given that the endpoint of any
intellective activity is always some movement, action or activity (Montessori,
1949/1967). Indeed, movement occupies a central position in human cognitive activity
(Laban, 1966). To be sure, it has been recently proposed that there is an elaborate
information-processing system involved in movement with extensive bi-directional
pathways to parallel systems in the brain that are involved in planning, reasoning, and
emotion (Leiner, Leiner & Dow, 1986, 1989, 1993a,b). The cerebellum, traditionally
viewed as directing and controlling voluntary movement may play a much larger role
in thought itself (Ito, 1984, 1986, 1993). The resulting `information-processinga system
could conceivably go beyond the traditional control of motor functions subserved by
the cerebral motor cortex to enable the manipulation of kinesthetic ideas (Leiner,
Leiner & Dow, 1986). In e!ect, it appears that we `thinka kinesically too (Gardner,
1993; Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 1998; Kennedy, 1997; Nicoladis, Mayberry
& Genesee, 1999; Seitz, 1992, 1993, 1994a, b, 1996). For example, it has been
postulated that thinking is an advanced form of skilled behavior that has evolved from
earlier modes of #exible adaptation to the environment (Bartlett, 1958), that the body
is central to mathematical understanding (Lako! & Nunez, 1997), that speech and
gesture form parallel computational systems (McNeill, 1985, 1989, 1992), and that
mental practice alone improves physical skills (Hinshaw, 1992; Ogles, Lynn, Masters,
Hoefel & Marsden, 1994).
In terms of development, nonverbal behavior is central to expression and commun-
ication. Infants and young children learn to communicate with gestures before they
learn to speak (Bruner, 1983) and this mode of communication continues into
adulthood where a large body of kinesic behaviors augments or replaces language
(e.g., illustrators, regulators, a!ect displays, diectics, metaphoric gestures, emblems,
and a huge class of procedural knowledge and skills) (Ekman & Friesen, 1969;
McNeill, 1992). To be sure, there have been recent arguments made for the gestural
origins of language and the fact that both speech and hand control originate from the
same neural systems (Corballis, 1999). Choreography and dance, sports, and crafts-
manship are but a few examples of nonverbal abilities. Evidences from the study of the
deaf and sign languages (Klima & Bellugi, 1980), the blind and the reading of Braille
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text (Seitz, 1993), and use of body therapies (Feldenkrais, 1991), are a few other
examples. Historically, the suppression of sign language use among the deaf has
resulted in a signi"cant deterioration in the intellectual achievement of deaf children
(Sacks, 1990) and developmentally, in delays in cognitive and social development
(Bebko, Burke, Craven & Sarlo, 1992). With regard to the blind, Braille is essentially
the `readinga of a tactile code in which the number and spatial forms of the raised dots
are critical (Hardman, Drew, Egan & Wolf, 1993). In human cultures, facial expres-
sion, gesture and posture, gaze, spatial behavior among conspeci"cs, touch, bodily
movements, vocalization, smell, and appearance are essential and basic to commun-
ication (Argyle, 1989). Even Charles Darwin went so far as to suggest that, for
example, head shaking in infants originates in the mother}child relationship (Darwin,
1872/1965).
The experience of music is an elegant speci"c example of the body in thought:
Loudness, tonal colors, musical beat and tempo, dynamic changes, melodic phrasing
and contours, chromatic harmonies, musical accents, accelerando, syncopation,
rhythmic ostinato, among other aspects, form the bodily basis of meaning in the
musical domain. Indeed, pedagogical practices such as the Dalcroze, Kodaly, Or!,
and Suzuki methods capitalize on the fact that basic elements of music (rhythm and
musical dynamics, intervallic relationships such as pitch and melody, and sonority)
can be most e!ectively taught through physical motion using such devices as rhythm,
rhythmic solfege, and improvisation (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1930/1976).
One reason for the importance of studying motor abilities is the recognition that
evidence from the study of children's and adult's motor capacities can address
long-standing questions in other psychological domains such as the nature of human
learning and memory, planning, and categorization, to name a few. Another reason is
that it throws into relief some of the major problems with the contemporary `repres-
entationala view of the mind. Classical cognitivist and connectionist models posit
a Cartesian disembodiment of mind assuming that brain events can adequately
explain thought and related notions such as intellect. While much has been written
about the subject, little is known about how the mind actually represents anything.
That is to say, how does the brain give rise to mental states that `representa the
external world (McGuinn, 1999)? One problem with the representational view is that
it presumes an hierarchical system in which the brain is a distributor of commands
and the body is an ambassador of purpose or, to put it another way, the brain
regulates our bodies as does a CEO a corporation: the knowledge #ow is one way and
top-down. Linked to this view is the computer metaphor of the mind in which
thinking is solely a brain-based (or CPU-based) activity. This standard view has been
popularized in such early movies as `Invaders from Marsa (1963) in which a head in a
glass"lled dome commands a motley assortment of unintelligent drones as they
attempt to invade and take over the human world.
What has been left out of these accounts of cognition is the central importance of
the body in thought. And when one puts the body back in thought, or what are now
called `embodied minda approaches to human thought and intelligence, one is left
with a very di!erent perspective on human thinking. For instance, the human
propensity for categorization is structured by metaphoric, imagistic, and schematizing
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New Ideas in Psychology 18 (2000) 23
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abilities that are themselves undergirded by perceptual and motor capacities
(Jackson, 1983; Johnson, 1987). Moreover, these capacities rest on a biological
infrastructure.
2. The biological basis of intelligent movement
Recent "ndings in the neurosciences indicate reciprocal and parallel neural path-
ways between the cerebellum, traditionally viewed as controlling gross and "ne motor
functions but now hypothesized to play a role in thought itself (Ito, 1984, 1986, 1993),
and the frontal cortex, where working memory and executive functions such as
planning, monitoring, task management, and focusing attention occur (Smith & Jon-
ides, 1999). It has been suggested that the evolutionary signi"cance of these pathways
is that they enable the kinesic manipulation of concept and ideas (Bracke-Tolkmitt
et al., 1989; Leiner et al., 1986, 1989, 1993a,b). For instance, inadequate network
connections among the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, thalamic pathways, and cere-
bellar sites lead to `cognitive dysmetriaa or problems in the processing, coordination,
and prioritizing of information that may play a role in the genesis of schizophrenia
and other mental illnesses (Andreasen, Paradiso & O'Leary, 1998). Similarly, the
`cerebellar cognitive a!ective syndromea is linked to disturbances in language (e.g.,
agrammatism), personality (e.g., blunted a!ect), spatial cognition (e.g., de"cits in
visuospatial memory), and executive functions (e.g., di$culties in planning) as a result
of disruption of network connections. Whereas cerebellar lesions are associated with
disturbed a!ect, posterior lobe lesions are associated with problems in cognitive
processing. Nonetheless, the cerebellum is posited to integrate diverse internal repres-
entations with self-generated activity and the external world through corticopontine,
pontocerebellar, cerebellothalamic, and thalamocortical network pathways and loops
(Schmahmann & Sherman, 1998). In fact, there is evidence of cerebello-thalamocorti-
cal loops from the dentate part of the cerebellum to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
involved in spatial working memory that would suggest nonmotor functions (Middle-
ton & Strick, 1994). Moreover, the parallel evolution of both the dentate nucleus and
regions of the frontal lobe in hominids as well as the integration of stereoscopic vision
and use of the hands in primate evolution (Sanides, 1970) suggests motor activity as
the basis of intelligence. Indeed, it has been postulated that the core of human intellect
is the capacity of more recent abilities to draw on computational domains that
evolved for other tasks (Rozin, 1976).
The motor basis of concepts and ideas is also reported in case studies of cerebellar
damage where there are de"cits in practice-related learning (e.g., the wearing of
magnifying or reducing prisms) and in detection of errors (e.g., selecting between
synonyms and nonsynonyms). These studies suggest that if the cerebellum is the
interface between sensory representations and motor output, it may serve as an
anatomically distinct long-term memory and learning system (Fiez, Peterson, Cheney
& Raichle, 1992) or modi"able pattern recognition system (Marr, 1969). Moreover,
basal ganglia defects and deterioration of the substantia nigra, locus ceruleus, and
raphe nuclei in the brainstem that upset dopamine pathways, result in cognitive (e.g.,
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New Ideas in Psychology 18 (2000) 23
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dementia and depression) as well as motor de"cits. These de"cits are characteristic of
both Pakinson's disease, in which an increase in inhibitory signals leads to a reduction
in cortical excitation and movement (DeLong, 1990; Youdim & Riederer, 1997), and
Huntington's disease in which a reduction in inhibitory signals leads to an increase in
cortical potentiation and movement (Cote & Crutcher, 1991); Middleton & Strick,
1994). Such dual circuits suggest that the ability to shift behavioral set, that is, initiate
action, underlies the production of novel behavior or the amalgamation of patterned
behavior into novel sequences. Indeed, repetitive stereotyped movement patterns (e.g.,
obsessive}compulsive behavior and Gilles de Tourette syndrome) indicate the malfun-
ctioning of this system (Gazzaniga, Ivry & Mangun, 1998).
Since the beginning of the 1990s, research on the cerebellum and related `motora
structures has undergone a renaissance. The cerebellum is now known to play an
important role in timing functions that are utilized by perceptual and cognitive
systems (Gazzaniga et al., 1998; Ghez, 1991b; Wickelgren, 1998, 1999), but there is also
recent evidence that it, along with the basal ganglia (Cote & Crutcher, 1991; DeLong,
1990; White, 1997), plays a role in planning, regulation, and attention (Akshoomo!
& Courchesne, 1994; Courchesne et al., 1994). Indeed, there appears to be two
separate pathways for planning movement: the extrapyramidal tracts originating in
the brainstem and the corticospinal tracts originating in the motor cortex. Whereas
the former speci"es the goal or target location and is less #exible, the latter speci"es
the trajectory of action (i.e., distance) and has evolved as a more #exible system
(Gazzaniga et al., 1998). Both pathways indicate that cognition follows action (e.g.,
speci"cation of location and distance). Moreover, it has been posited that the cerebel-
lum contributes to basic associative learning processes (e.g., associating words with
colors; Bracke-Tolkmitt et al., 1989) and the ability to rapidly shift attention both
within and between sensory modalities (Akshoomo! & Courchesne, 1994). The latter
may lie at the core of autism, in which maldevelopment of the cerebellum leads to
poor social and cognitive development even in the absence of damage to the hip-
pocampus and amygdala (Courchesne et al., 1994). On the other hand, the basal
ganglia, via the dorsolateral prefrontal circuit, appears to store representations of
spatiotemporal contexts concerned with orientation in space, and the lateral orbitof-
rontal circuit with the ability to shift from one mental set to another (Cote & Crutcher,
1991). The storage of these representations in the basal ganglia may abet the frontal
cortex in implementing appropriate behaviors (White, 1997).
Moreover, some parts of the motor systems are specialized for acquisition of new
motor behaviors under external guidance (lateral premotor, parietal, and neocerebel-
lar regions; Ghez, 1991a; Willingham, 1998), whereas other parts are specialized for
already acquired skilled motor plans (supplementary motor, dorsolateral prefrontal,
and basal ganglionic areas; Curran, 1995; Goldberg, 1985). Another `motora struc-
ture, the posterior parietal cortex, is responsible for creating a frame of reference (i.e.,
spatial, visual, vestibular, and haptic) for movement (Ghez, 1991a; Willingham, 1998)
and for coordinating multimodal sensory feedback with motor imagery (Crammond,
1997). Moreover, new evidence on the function of the motor cortex indicates that it
stores (i.e., `kinesthetica or procedural memory) and implements the serial order of
a motor plan (Carpenter, Georgopoulos & Pellizzer, 1999), what I will call the syntax
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