Explaining religious ideas-elements of a cognitive approach, Seminarium, Religioznawstwo kognitywne
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Explaining Religious Ideas: Elements of a Cognitive Approach
Author(s): Pascal Boyer
Source: Numen, Vol. 39, Fasc. 1 (Jun., 1992), pp. 27-57
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Numen.
Numen,
Vol.
XXXIX,
Fasc. 1
EXPLAINING RELIGIOUS IDEAS:
ELEMENTS OF A COGNITIVE APPROACH
PASCAL BOYER
Summary
This
paper
outlines an
anthropological approach
to
religious representations
that is
grounded
in recent
findings
and
hypotheses
in
cognitive psychology.
The
argument proceeds
in four
points.
First,
the main
goal
of this framework
is to
account for the recurrence of certain
types
of mental
representations
in
religious
systems.
Recurrent features are not
necessarily
universal.
They
are the outcome
of
cognitive systems
that make certain
representations
easier to
acquire
than others.
Second,
a
cognitive
approach
must take into account the
diversity
of
religious
representations.
It is
argued
here that
religious systems bring together ontological
assumptions,
causal
claims, episode types
and social
categories.
These four
"repertoires" may
have different functional
properties,
and
may
therefore be
acquired
and
represented
in different
ways.
Third,
universal features
of
tacit,
intuitive
systems may impose strong
constraints on the
variability
of
religious
ideas. This is
illustrated on the basis of
ethnographic
data.
Finally,
the
type
of
representations
one finds in
religious belief-systems
consists in
conjectures,
the
cognitive
salience of which is variable and should be evaluated
in
precise
terms.
Contrary
to other domains of
anthropological study,
theories of
religious
belief and action have not been much influenced so far
by
the
remarkable
development
of
cognitive
science.
True,
there is in
anthropology
a
subdiscipline
known as
"cognitive anthropology"
(or "ethnosemantics")
which focuses
on the
cognitive aspects
of
cultural
representations.
This
approach,
however,
has been so far
limited to
representations
of the
everyday
world:
biological
tax-
onomies,
classification of
daily
activities,
kinship terminologies,
etc.1
Religion,
on the other
hand,
is
relatively neglected
in
cognitive approaches.
This
is
paradoxical,
in view of the
impor-
tance of
religious
belief and action
in
anthropological theory
and
practice.
There
are,
obviously,
some notable
exceptions
to this
generalisation (see e.g. Dougherty
1985,
Dougherty
& Fernandez
1980,
1982,
Lawson & Mc
Cauley 1990). By
and
large,
however,
the
study
of
religious
belief and action is still conducted
in the
framework of
anthropological
theories which
pay
little
if
any
atten-
tion to the
findings
and
hypotheses
of
cognitive
science.2
28
Pascal
Boyer
In this
paper,
I will
present
the elements of a
possible cognitive
approach
to
religious representations.3
This
paper
is therefore
largely
programmatic
and
partly speculative.
The research
pro-
gramme, however,
is not
very
far removed from actual
cognitive
research,
and the
speculation
is
mostly
consistent
with
both
anthropological
and
psychological
research.
My
aim here is to show
that a
cognitive approach
is
possible,
and to examine how it can
account for the
representation
and transmission of
religious
representations.
The
theory
is about
religious
ideas rather than
"religions"
in the broad sense. The aim is to describe the
processes
whereby subjects acquire, represent
and transmit certain
ideas
and
practices.
The
theory may
not be sufficient to account
for
the social
dynamics
of
religious
movements or the historical
development
of
religious
doctrines. Such
"macro-phenomena"
of
religious
transmission are not
directly
within the
scope
of a
cognitive
theory.
In the
following pages
I
will
put
forward four main
hypotheses.
The first one is that the
goal
of a
cognitive approach
is to account
for
the recurrenceof certain features of
religious representations
in
many
different cultures. This
general objective
is often
misconstrued,
and I will
try
and
give
a formulation which avoids
certain common
misunderstandings.
The second
point
is the
cognitive
diversity of
religious
ideas. In a
given
culture,
the set of
representations
that constitute each
individual's
religious
ideas
is
distributed
in several
"repertoires",
which have different func-
tional
properties.
Here
I
will
identify
four such
cognitive reper-
toires,
which are
particularly important
in
the
description
of
religious representations.
The
third
hypothesis
is about the
cognitive
constraintson the content and
organisation
of
religious
ideas.
Far
from
being pure
cultural
constructions,
religious systems appear
to
be
strongly
constrained
by
universal,
probably
innate
properties
of
cognitive systems, especially
those
properties
which
govern people's
intuitive
understanding
of their
everyday
world. A fourth
point
is
that we need a
precise
notion
of
cognitive
saliencein order to describe
and
explain
the
processes
of
acquisition
and belief-fixation in the
domain of cultural
knowledge.
For each of
these four
points,
I will
try
to show that a
cognitive approach provides
a
plausible
alter-
native to classical
anthropological
theories of
religion.
Explaining Religious
Ideas
29
I
UNIVERSALS,
RECURRENCE
AND EXPLANATION
It
may
seem the obvious first
step,
in the construction of a
general theory
of
religion,
to enumerate the universal features
which the
theory
will set out to
explain. Indeed,
this is
very
much
what can be found in most
anthropological attempts
so far.4
Here,
however,
I will
argue
that
this
seemingly
obvious
way
of
proceeding
is in fact mistaken and
misleading,
and that
the
search
for univer-
sals is the main reason
why anthropology
has not
produced
a
theoretically plausible
account of
religious
ideas. In what
follows,
I will
try
to show how the
problem
of universals conceals
other,
important aspects
of the
problem.
The main
starting point
of the
theory
outlined here is
that,
in the
variety
of cultural
systems
of
religious
belief,
there is a notable recur-
renceof certain
precise
themes or
ideas,
and that this recurrence
ought
to be
explained.
These themes or ideas are not
universal,
but
they
constitute a
repertoire
most elements of which can be found in
most
cultures,
in one form or
another. To take but a few
examples,
it is assumed in
many (but
not
all)
cultures that
a
non-physical
com-
ponent
of
persons
survives after
death,
to become an invisible
intentional
being,
endowed with
perceptions,
beliefs and inten-
tions. In the same
way,
it is assumed in
many (but
not
all)
cultures
that certain
people
are
especially likely
to receive direct
inspiration
or
messages
from extra-natural
agencies,
like
gods
and
spirits.
In
many (but
not
all)
cultures it is admitted that
performing
certain
ritual
recipes
in the exact
way
and order
prescribed
can
bring
about
changes
in
physical
states of
affairs, through
causal mechanisms
which are
presumed
but not observable. Such features are wide-
spread
in
many
cultures,
yet they
are not
necessarily present
in all
of them. Each feature is
present
in most
cultures,
each
culture has
many
of those features in its set of
religious
ideas,
yet
none of them
should be taken a
priori
as universal.
features
In
cultural
anthropology,
the recurrence of certain
religious
ideas
is not
explained
in a
satisfactory way,
for the
simple
reason that is
Two obstaclesto the
study of
recurrent
30
Pascal
Boyer
not
explained
at all. The few features
I
mentioned above are well-
known to most students of
religion.
Their recurrence in different
cultures,
however,
is not considered an
object
of scientific
inquiry,
for two
symmetrical
reasons.
A first obstacle is the
pre-theoretical,
instinctive form of
relativism that is somehow intrinsic to
anthropological investiga-
tion. Because
anthropologists
are
professionally
trained
to detect
and
emphasize
cultural
differences,
they naturally
under-estimate
the
recurrence
of similar ideas in
different
cultures.
Moreover,
when this recurrence is
noticed,
it is
often treated
as
a
deceptive
appearance,
which conceals
underlying
differences.
It is
widely
assumed
that
apparently
similar beliefs
cannot
really
be
similar,
because
they
occur
in
different "cultural contexts". This
idea,
however,
is
vague enough
to contain both a trivial truth and a
pro-
found
fallacy.
Take for
example
the
widespread
idea that the
gods
are so remote that one cannot communicate with them
except
through
the channel of
inspired
mediums.
Obviously,
this idea can
take on
very
different
"meanings"
in
different
cultures;
more
precisely,
it carries rather different
implications,
for those who
think that the
gods
have a direct influence on the
living's
well-
being,
and those who think that
they
do not. The
idea that certain
people
are
privileged
"channels", however,
is the same idea in
both contexts. We need a
theory
that could account for the
fact
that
this
idea
is so
widespread,
while
others are not.
Conversely,
the
general study
of
religious
ideas is often
hampered by
the
widespread
idea,
that "human
nature",
the
proper subject-matter
of cultural
anthropology,
is manifest
only
in
the universal features of the
species.
What is not universal in
human cultures has therefore
nothing
to do with human nature. In
other
words,
one assumes that there is a
division,
between cultural
invariants on the one
hand,
which are
explainable
by
various non-
cultural factors
(ecological, biological, psychological,
etc.),
and the
rest. Cultural features which are not universal are
ipsofacto
outside
the influence of those various
ecological, biological, psychological
etc.,
factors. If certain traits of
religious
ideas are
widespread
but
not
universal,
they
are therefore considered outside the
scope
of a
general theory
of
religion. Obviously,
this
argument
rests on a con-
fusion of
levels,
between
processes
and their outcome. That a
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